Situational awareness, countersurveillance and protective intelligence.

Situational awareness, countersurveillance and protective intelligence.

There is very little chance the Lebanese government will be able to establish integrity in its law enforcement agencies, or bring law and order to large portions of the country, any time soon. Official corruption and ineptitude are endemic in Lebanon, which means that Lebanese citizens and visiting foreigners will have to face the threat of political unrest for the foreseeable future. We believe that for civilians and visiting foreigners, the threat of violence exceeds the threat of being hit by a stray bullet from a political firefight. Indeed, things are deteriorating so badly that even professional security guards, are now in need of security themselves. In an even more incredible twist of irony, anti-February 14th factions will be targeted as well...

This environment — and the concerns it has sparked — has provided huge financial opportunities for the private security industry in Lebanon. Armored car sales have gone through the roof, as have the number of uniformed guards and executive protection personnel. In fact, the demand for personnel is so acute that security companies are scrambling to find candidates. Such a scramble presents a host of obvious problems, ranging from lack of qualifications to insufficient vetting... In addition to old-fashioned security services, new security-technology companies are also cashing in on the environment of fear, but even high-tech bomb detection devices can have significant drawbacks and shortcomings....

For many people, armored cars and armed bodyguards can provide a false sense of security, and technology can become a deadly crutch that promotes complacency and actually increases vulnerability. Physical security measures are not enough. The presence of armed bodyguards — or armed guards combined with armored vehicles — does not provide absolute security. This is especially true in Beirut, where large teams of military regularly conduct exercises using military ordnance. Frankly, there are very few executive protection details in the world that have the training and armament to withstand an assault by the infamous White House Murder INC, of Asef SHAWKAT. Private security guards are frequently overwhelmed by Lebanese criminals and either killed or forced to flee for their own safety. As we noted in February 12th 2008 after the assassination of Imad F. Moughnieh, intelligence and military head of the Hezbollah in downtown Kafarsoussa, at the hands of the highest-ranking military intelligence thug in Damascus, Asef Shawkat..., physical security measures must be supplemented by situational awareness, countersurveillance and protective intelligence....all the time, even in "supposedly" friendly environments, riddled with corrupt mafia figures of the Alawite minority Dictatorship of Damascus of the Kilab sect of Al-ASSADS...kowtowing to CIA, DGSE, DST, MI6 and MOSSAD ....

Assassins look for and exploit vulnerabilities.... Their chances for success increase greatly if they are allowed to conduct surveillance at will and are given the opportunity to thoroughly assess the protective security program... We have seen several cases in Lebanon in which the criminal murderers even chose to attack despite security measures. In such cases, killers from the Beirut area section, attack with adequate resources to overcome existing security. For example, if there are protective agents, the attackers will plan to neutralize them first. If there is an armored vehicle, they will find ways to defeat the armor or grab the target when he or she might be outside the vehicle. Because of this, criminal assassins of Asef Shawkat's covert teams must not be allowed to conduct surveillance at will... but where are the pros...? where are the knowledgeable CI officers, the MI, the General security services....none have any situational awareness to speak of....

Like many crimes, assassination is a process. There are certain steps that must be taken to conduct an assassination and certain times during the process when those executing it are vulnerable to detection... While these steps may be condensed and accomplished quite quickly in an ad hoc express murder, they are nonetheless followed. In fact, because of the particular steps involved in conducting an assassination, the process is not unlike that followed to execute a terrorist attack. The common steps are target selection, planning, deployment, attack, escape and exploitation...

Like the perpetrators of a terrorist attack, those conducting an assassination are most vulnerable to detection when they are conducting surveillance — before they are ready to deploy and conduct their attack. As we’ve noted several times in past analyses, one of the secrets of countersurveillance is that most criminals are not very good at conducting surveillance. The primary reason they succeed is that no one is looking for them....for complete ignorance, complacency and utter negligence, as was the case with General Francois El-HAJJ....

Of course, assassins are also very obvious once they launch their attack, pull their stunts and perhaps even begin to escape frantically. By this time, however, it might very well be too late to escape their attack. They will have selected their attack site and employed the forces they believe they need to complete the operation. While the assassins could botch their operation and the target could escape unscathed, it is simply not practical to pin one’s hopes on that possibility. It is clearly better to spot the assassins early and avoid their trap before it is sprung and the bombs start exploding remotely... in the most secure areas of grand Beirut and elsewhere, as seen in the past.

We have seen many instances of people in Lebanon with armed security being killed, and we believe we will likely see more cases of this in the coming months. This trend is due not only to the presence of highly armed, trained and aggressive assassins and the low quality of most security personnel, but also to people placing their trust solely in reactive physical security. Ignoring the very real value of critical, proactive measures such as situational awareness, countersurveillance and protective intelligence can be a fatal mistake....and that is why Raymond AZAR and his thugs at MI, were so pervasive in making sure that all security details of Mr. Elie Hobeika were banned from doing security rounds in Hazmieh, outside the immediate proximity of the residence itself....and this was done repeatedly... months ahead of the odious hit....