Monday, January 26, 2009

-- Another Iran counter-proliferation spy who was involved in CIA program is outed--

-- Another Iran counter-proliferation spy who was involved in CIA program is outed--

The fallout from the exposure by the Bush White House of the covert CIA identity of Valerie Plame Wilson and the Brewster Jennings & Associates CIA counter-proliferation front company is still claiming new victims.

The latest is a Canadian-Iranian businessman who was spying on Iran's nuclear program for Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND)....who are more and
more kowtowing for CIA2 and MOSSAD. Mossad has a major and sprawling facility at Frankfurt's airport...and throughout Germany...

We first reported on the damage caused to U.S. intelligence and that of its allies by the White House disclosures about the CIA's covert counter-proliferation programs.

On May 31, 2006, We reported: "On May 26, Italian police discovered the badly decomposed body of Canadian diplomat Lewis B. Miskell in a Naples sewer. Miskell, 49, had been stabbed in the abdomen. Intelligence sources report that Miskell, who assigned to the Canadian embassy in Vienna, Austria, was the attaché responsible for liaison to UN specialized agencies in Vienna. The most important UN agency in the Austrian capital is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the nexus for nuclear talks with Iran and a significant activity surrounding the activities of the defunct Brewster Jennings Associates, the covert weapons counter-proliferation front company outed by the Bush White House. The clampdown on information about Miskell by the pro-Bush Stephen Harper government in Canada indicates that Miskell may have had an intelligence function and was operating under "official cover" at the Canadian embassy in Vienna."

In the same May 31, 2006 report, we revealed: "the Swiss Federal Prosecutor's Office has complained to the United States that the Bush administration has failed to cooperate with Switzerland's efforts to track the A Q Khan nuclear proliferation network. The Bush administration's multiple refusals to assist Switzerland in probing the Khan network, which was a major target of the CIA's Counter-Proliferation Division, Brewster Jennings Associates, and Valerie Plame Wilson, was revealed by former UN weapons inspector David Albright. Switzerland arrested three members of the Tinner family -- Friedrich, Urs, and Marco -- for illegally supplying centrifuges from a Malaysian company to Libya. Urs Tinner has been rumored to have been a U.S. intelligence asset. Switzerland has received cooperation in its probe from Southeast Asian nations, including Malaysia and Thailand, and South Africa. All three are key transit points for nuclear materials involving Russian-Israeli Mafia assets who, in turn, are linked to top members of the Bush administration, including Vice President Dick Cheney."

Urs Tinner recently revealed that he was a CIA asset in the agency's counter-proliferation network.

On February 21, 2008, we reported: "we have learned from UN sources that the 19th Floor from which UN employee Maria DiBiase plunged to her death in the early morning of February 17, houses the Department of Peace-keeping Operations/Field Administration and Logistics Division (DPKO/FALD). The offices also house the code machines used for the encrypted fax machines used for DPKO activities in addition to a spare set of code machines used for DPKO rapid response teams. DiBiase, an Austrian national, was a computer specialist for the UN and a former Conference Services staff member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria. We have learned that the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) maintained in a special UN's computer database all the files on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction program retrieved from compact disks provided to UNSCOM by Saddam's government prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The database is said to include all the black market nuclear suppliers involved in providing materials to Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Libya via Turkey and the A Q Khan smuggling network. The list reportedly includes front companies in Switzerland linked to Marc Rich, the American fugitive pardoned by President Clinton, and Dick Cheney. DiBiase is said to have arrived at work Sunday morning to finish a project that was due on Monday morning. We have been told that there may have been a 'black bag' operation taking place on the 19th floor at the same time DiBiase arrived at work."

On March 15, 2007, we reported on another possible casualty of the White House disclosures: "Former Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Ali Reza Asghari may be a further casualty of the outing by the Bush White House and its neo-con media allies of covert CIA agent Valerie Plame Wilson and her Brewster Jennings and Associates front company, according to knowledgeable Turkish sources. "Asghari may have been a CIA 'HVA' (high value asset)," according to one source close to the Turkish intelligence service, MIT. Asghari was definitely a big fish for Western intelligence. Asghari was involved with Hezbollah in Lebanon as Iran's Syria-based liaison with the group. As Deputy Defense Minister, Asghari was also closely involved with Iran's short-range and long-range missiles, as well as nuclear materiel procurement. Asghari had traveled extensively to Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, and India. . . . It is known that Asghari visited Istanbul on a few occasions -- and that city was also a nexus for the activities of Brewster Jennings. While on a trip to Damascus relating to his oversight of the Iran-Syria defense pact, Asghari was contacted by an "arms dealer" in Istanbul, with whom he was familiar from past trips. The arms dealer requested that Asghari come to Istanbul for a meeting. Asghari contacted Tehran and requested permission to travel to Istanbul. Tehran granted Asghari permission to go to Turkey and the Iranian consulate in Istanbul made his hotel reservations. On December 7, 2006, Asghari checked into the Ceyhan Hotel in Istanbul, favored by visiting Iranian officials. Asghari's reservations were for three days. On December 8, Asghari disappeared. Iran reported Asghari missing to Interpol on December 26 and informed the Turkish government about Asghari's missing status on February 4."

Der Spiegel has been reporting on another possible casualty of the Brewster Jennings disclosures. Last October 5, a 61-year old Iranian businessman and top German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) asset, code named "Sinbad," was arrested by German the Customs Criminological Office (ZKA) at Frankfurt Airport. The arrest sent shock waves through the BND, CIA, and, in what could be a link to the murder of Miskell, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Both the CIA and CSIS were involved with "Sinbad's" top secret missions in Iran and elsewhere. Der Spiegel reported that Israel's Mossad had tried to gain access to "Sinbad" but was rebuffed by the Germans.

"Sinbad" was charged by German customs authorities with trying to illegally export missile technology to Iran. "Sinbad" had been the manager of a company in Hesse that was likely another front company used to stem the flow of workable nuclear technology to Iran. "Sinbad" had reportedly been operating under non-official cover for the BND, CIA, and CSIS for ten years prior to his arrest by the German customs police. Der Spiegel reported that "Sinbad" was one of the most important sources for BND and CIA intelligence on Iran's nuclear program. "Sinbad's" reports on Iran were delivered directly to German Social Democratic Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The BND now fears that because of German Customs arrest of "Sinbad," it will be more difficult to obtain intelligence on Iranian nuclear operations, something that can only benefit Israeli hard liners who are pushing for a military showdown with Iran.

On October 14, 2008, Der Spiegel reported that "Sinbad" "obtained pictures of tunnel rock drills, details of secret deposits, and up-to-date documents on the progress in developing delivery technology for nuclear warheads." "Sinbad" obtained the information directly from cognizant ministries in Tehran to which he had "excellent access." At the Pullach center of the BND, the agency's Department 1 supervised "Sinbad, and in Berlin, at the location of BND's Department 3, analysts processed "Sinbad's" information. BND was thrilled with the quality of the intelligence. When combined with other intelligence BND received from other sources, the BND and CIA had unique access to the highest secrets of Iran's nuclear program. Ironically, it was another BND asset, code named "Curveball," Iraqi national Rafid Ahmed Alwan, whose bogus intelligence helped lead the United States into war in Iraq after it was hyped by the pro-Israeli think tanks and political operations in Washington.

"Sinbad" was also apparently an important agent who had penetrated the supply chain operated by Pakistan's A Q Khan nuclear proliferation network. "Sinbad" had established another front company, in addition to his firm in Hesse, in Canada, with the approval of the BND.

In early 2008, ZKA initiated taps of "Sinbad's" telephones and e-mail traffic monitored, as well as his travels. ZKA charged that "Sinbad" had exported "dual use" technology to Iran twice and was planning on two more such deliveries. The recipient of the technology in Iran was said to be on a ZKA "black list" of firms in Iran covered by export restrictions by the Germans. From the case of the Tinners in Switzerland, it is known that the CIA was expediting faulty nuclear technology to Iran and other countries, including Libya. "Sinbad" was exporting, in violation of Germany's External Trade Act, technology thought to be for use in Iran's Shahab missiles. The BND was unable to invoke a national security provision to rescue its top agent because "Sinbad" had not been arrested for national security breaches but for export violations. German Chief Federal Prosecutor Monika Harms appears to want "Sinbad's" operations against Iran to fail and, in some ways, she is like U.S. Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald in the Plame/Brewster Jennings compromise. Harms rebuffed Ernst Uhrlau, the head of BND, in dropping the case against "Sinbad."

Harms, like Fitzgerald, appears more interested in rolling up the counter-proliferation operation, probably to ensure Israeli-inspired military actions against Iran and the silencing of those who may have information on the involvement of Israelis, Turks, Americans, and others in supplying Iran outside of the CIA's, CSIS's, and BND's program.